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Reputation testimony offered to show that the character of
a witness is such that he is not the type of person who is to be
believed under oath' is to be sharply distinguished from reputa-
tion testimony offered to show that the character of the defend-
ant is such that he is not the type of person who would commit
the crime charged.2 In the former instance it is clear from Ar-
ticle 490 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that the inquiry may
be as to (1) the witness' general reputation for truth, or (2) the
witness' general moral character. In the latter instance, how-
ever, it is clear from Article 4803 that where the issue is guilt or
innocence of the defendant, the reputation testimony must be re-
stricted to the moral qualities pertinent to the crime for which
the defendant is being charged. In State v. Kelly,4 the court, in
a case involving an alleged crime against nature, cited Article
480 and affirmed the action of the trial court in restricting testi-
mony of defendant's character witness "to show character only
as to such moral qualities as have pertinence to the crime with
which these defendants are charged," 5 and in instructing the
jury "to disregard all previous testimony as to defendant's char-
acter except as to those answers relating to moral qualities perti-
nent to the crime charged."6 The ruling is clearly sound.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University; Faculty Editor, Louisiana
Law Review.
1. See LA. R.S. 15:490 et seq. (1950).
2. See id. 15:479-483.
3. See also State v. Thornhill, 188 La. 762, 788, 178 So. 343, 352 (1938),
wherein it is stated: "As article 480 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is a
statutory requirement, restricting proof of character to such moral qualities
as have pertinence to the crime charged, a defendant is bound by such restriction,
and, in a murder case, must ask the witness if he knows the general reputation
of the accused as being a quiet, peaceable, and law-abiding citizen in the com-
munity in which he lives.
"To hold otherwise would make the statute a dead letter, and permit proof of
the general reputation of the defendant as good, without any pertinent restriction
whatever, thereby enabling a defendant to evade the statute, and still get before
the jury proof of his good character."
4. 237 La. 991, 112 So.2d 687 (1959).
5. Id. at 996, 112 So.2d at 688-89.
6. Id. at 996-97, 112 So.2d at 689.
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The provisions of Article 480 also provided ample authority
for the court's action in State v. Knox 7 in upholding the ruling of
the trial judge excluding a letter offered by defendant, who was
being tried for armed robbery. The letter had been purportedly
written by an- employer, was addressed: "To whom it may con-
cern," and stated that "defendant's work was satisfactory.
'8
The fact that defendant had or had not performed his work satis-
factorily for an employer certainly was not evidence restricted
to showing the moral qualities pertinent to the crime of armed
robbery. The proffered evidence also fell far short of meeting
the test of admissibility on other grounds. According to Article
479, character depends upon the "general reputation that a man
has among his neighbors, not upon what particular persons think
of him." The tendered evidence did not meet this test. In addi-
tion, the person who purportedly wrote the letter was not pres-
ent in court and subject to cross-examination, nor was the let-
ter made under oath. The hearsay rule thus would clearly have
been violated by its admission. In addition, there was no testi-
mony identifying the signature on the letter, or its authenticity.
Flight of the Accused
In State v. McCrory,9 the lower court, over the objection of
the defendant, permitted the state to show the court order fixing
the appearance bond of the defendant, the bond itself, the fact
that defendant had gone to Chicago after the execution of the
bond, and that the surety had had him taken into custody there
and returned to Louisiana; and in addition, that defendant had
not appeared in answer to a notice for arraignment, and that a
bench warrant had been issued for his arrest. In its brief in the
Supreme Court, the state contended that the evidence was admis-
sible to counteract statements made by defense counsel in which
he allegedly stated or intimated that the state had been "guilty of
dilatory tactics and that it had arrested appellant and brought
him to trial because he was an ex-convict."10 To this the Su-
preme Court replied that in view of the fact that there was
nothing in the bill of exception or record to show that defense
counsel had engaged in the claimed tactics, and since there was
no per curiam by the trial judge, defendant's "claim of error is
7. 236 La. 461, 107 So.2d 719 (1959).
8. Id. at 467, 107 So.2d at 721.
9. 237 La. 747, 112 So.2d 432 (1959).
10. Id. at 755, 112 So.2d at 434.
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to be determined by the statements and facts contained in the
bills of exceptions and not by the prosecution's assertions of pur-
ported facts dehors the record.""
The Supreme Court stated that the evidence in question was
"irrelevant and could serve only to prejudice appellant before
the jury,' 2 that the evidence "had no bearing whatsoever on his
guilt or innocence, or his intent."'13 Reversal of the conviction
was postulated upon the action of the trial court in admitting
this and other testimony.
With deference, it is submitted that the evidence in question
was in fact relevant, and admissible as admission tending to
show consciousness of guilt on the part of defendant. The admis-
sibility of this evidence would seem to be supported by both the
commentators and the jurisprudence. Professor Wigmore states:
"It is to-day universally conceded that the fact of an accused's
flight, escape from custody, resistance to arrest, concealment,
assumption of a false name, and related conduct, are admissible
as evidence of consciousness of guilt, and thus of guilt itself."'14
In this connection, he cites numerous cases from all over the
country, a number of which admit evidence in situations analo-
gous to that presented in State v. McCrory. Prior Louisiana
cases 5 likewise would seem to indicate that the evidence adduced
was relevant as tending to show consciousness of guilt on the
part of the defendant, and that the admissibility of the evidence
could have been justified on this ground. The recent case of
State v. Neal,6 decided in 1957, seems particularly in point. The
defendant in that case, who was charged with the crime of at-
tempted murder, took a bill of exceptions to a remark by the
district attorney in his opening statement "that he would show
that the accused was apprehended in California, where she had
fled while out on bond pending trial.' I7 Defense counsel objected
on the ground that the remark was prejudicial and "amounted
to evidence of another crime." To this the Supreme Court re-
11. Id. at 755, 112 So.2d at 435.
12. Id. at 754, 112 So.2d at 434.
13. Ibid.
14. 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 111, § 276 (1940).
15. State v. Neal, 231 La. 1048, 93 So.2d 554 (1957) ; State v. Pullen, 130
La. 253, 57 So. 907 (1912) ; State v. Nash, 115 La. 719, 39 So. 854 (1905);
State v. Austin, 104 La. 410, 29 So. 23 (1900) ; State v. Middleton, 104 La. 233,
28 So. 914 (1900) ; State v. Harris, 48 La. Ann. 1189, 20 So. 729 (1896) ;State
v. Wingfield, 34 La. Ann. 1200 (1882) ; State v. Dufour, 31 La. Ann. 804 (1879)
State v. Beatty, 30 La. Ann. 1266 (1878).
16. 231 La. 1048, 93 So.2d 554 (1957).
17. Id. at 1051, 93 So.2d at 555.
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plied: "There is no merit in this bill. Evidence to show that the
accused fled the jurisdiction after the commission of the crime
is admissible to show consciousness of guilt, and it is immaterial
whether the flight occurs before formal charges are filed, before
arrest, after arrest and admission to bail, or after arrest and
escape from jail or from the custody of an officer. See State v.
Wingfield, 34 La. Ann. 1200; Wharton's Criminal Evidence, vol.
1, p. 414, sec. 205 (12th Ed. 1955) ; Marr's Criminal Jurispru-
dence of Louisiana, vol. II, pp. 866-867 (2d Ed. 1923). Jumping
bail is a crime denounced by Article 110.1 of the Criminal Code,
and evidence of that offense is, as counsel state, evidence of an-
other crime. Nevertheless, under the authorities cited above,
evidence of appellant's flight from the jurisdiction after being
charged with attempted murder and admitted to bail on that
charge is admissible on her trial on that charge."' 8
In the opinion of this writer, the statement in State v. Mc-
Crory that the evidence in question was irrelevant is erroneous,
and not in accord with prior jurisprudence in Louisiana or that
in other jurisdictions. It should be noted, however, that the pos-
sibility of justifying the admissibility of the evidence on the
ground that it was relevant to show consciousness of guilt on
the part of the defendant seems not to have been urged upon the
court. There is no indication that the court considered this pos-
sibility. Neither State v. Neal nor its antecedents were discussed
or cited, and it is to be anticipated that they, rather than the
McCrory case, will be followed in the future in this regard. It
should also be noted, perhaps, that the holding of the court that
the admitted evidence was irrelevant and prejudicial was merely
one of the grounds upon which the reversal of conviction was
postulated. 19
Matter Beyond the Scope of the Pleading
Citing and quoting from its earlier decision in the Gunter
case,20 the Supreme Court in State v. Burr2 1 held that in the ab-
sence of a special plea of insanity by defendant, evidence that he
had three years previously been committed to a mental institu-
tion for examination was inadmissible. Defense counsel had
argued that the evidence should have been admitted to assist the
jury in determining whether or not the defendant had the neces-
:18. Ibid.
19. Id. at 1051-52, 93 So.2d at 555.
20. 208 La. 694, 23 So.2d 305 (1945).
21. 237 La. 1065, 112 So.2d 713 (1959).
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sary guilty knowledge or criminal intent to commit the crime
charged. The court, relying upon the Gunter case, rejected this
contention.
Gruesome Photographs
In State v. Miller12 defendant was tried for the crime of ag-
gravated rape and one of the grounds he urged on appeal was the
action of the trial court of permitting the district attorney to
show on a "movie" screen certain colored slides of bruises on the
prosecuting witness allegedly inflicted by defendant. The evi-
dence appears to have been very relevant on the issue of the re-
sistance offered by the alleged victim. 23 In view of the relevancy
of the photographs and their relatively high probative value, and
the finding by the court that they were not "gruesome, morbid,
or of any other character as would prejudice the jury,' ' 24 and
the testimony by the Chief Criminologist for the Louisiana State
Police Crime Laboratory that the color film, as contrasted with
black and white film, provided a reasonable duplication of the
bruises and did not exaggerate them, it appears that the ruling
of the court was sound. The value of the evidence clearly seems
to have outweighed whatever risk of undue prejudice might have
been present.2 5
The case of State v. Stah126 also concerned the admissibility
of photographs alleged by the defendant to be gruesome. De-
fendant was being tried for the murder of one of two convicts
who had been killed in the same manner and at the same time
while they lay in adjacent beds in the penitentiary. Over the
objection of the defendant, two photographs taken at the scene
of the homicide were admitted in evidence, one showing the body
of the person for whose murder the defendant was being tried,
and the other showing both bodies. The trial judge had conceded
that the photographs were in fact gruesome, and the Supreme
Court concurred. Neverthless, relying upon State v. Ross,2
22. 237 La. 266, 111 So.2d 108 (1959).
23. LA. R.S. 14:42 (1950).
24. 237 La. 266, 269, 111 So.2d 108, 109 (1959).
25. For further discussion of the admissibility of photographs allegedly grue-
some, see The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1956-1957 'Term-
Evidence, 18 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEw 139 (1957) ; The Work of the Louisiana
,Supreme Court for the 1952-1953 Term-Evidence, 14 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
220 (1953); Note, 14 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 421 (1954).
26. 236 La. 362, 107 So.2d 670 (1959).
27. 217 La. 837, 47 So.2d 559 (1950), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana
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State v. Solomon,28 and upon the information furnished by the
trial judge's per curiam, the court held that no error had been
committed in receiving the photographs in evidence.
In his per curiam, the trial judge had stated "that the two
killings were actually one act or a continuing act, and that the
evidence of the killing of one of the dead men necessarily in-
cluded the killing of the other ... [and] that these photographs
were important to clarify to the jury the identity of the man for
whose murder the accused was being tried, the position of the
bodies bearing on whether there had been a struggle at the time
of the killings, the probability that the two men were asleep
when they were killed, and the location of their bunks with
reference to the bed of the principal state's witness; [and] that
all of these matters were issues in the case.' ' 29 In the light of
these findings, it would appear that although the circumstances
favoring admissibility are not as strong as those in State v.
Miller,8° the Supreme Court was probably correct in affirming
the action of the trial judge in admitting the photographs.
WITNESSES
Impeachment- Prior Arrests and Convictions
Prior to the amendment of Article 495 of the Code of Crim-
inal Procedure in 1952, the article provided in part that "a wit-
ness, whether he be the defendant or not, may be compelled to
answer on cross-examination whether or not he has ever been
indicted or arrested and how many times." It was clear, how-
ever, from other provisions of the same article that if the wit-
nes who was being questioned on cross-examination as to his
arrests or indictments, answered in the negative, the party
putting the question could not introduce evidence to disprove
his answer in the instant proceeding. Apparently, it was felt
that the fact of prior arrests had sufficient relevancy to the
witness' credibility to justify opening the matter on cross-
examination, but was too remote to warrant further investiga-
tion in the particular proceeding. Of course, this rule would not
Supreme Court for the 1949-1950 Term -Evidence, 11 LOUISIANA LAW REVIW
222, 231 (1951).
28. 222 La. 269, 62 So.2d 481 (1953), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana
Supreme Court for the 1952-1953 Term -Evidence, 14 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
220 (1953).
29. 236 La. 362, 376, 107 So.2d 670, 675 (1959).
30. 237 La. 266, 111 So.2d 108 (1959), discussed page 339 supra.
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have prevented a showing of the prior arrest or indictment in
a subsequent prosecution of a recalcitrant witness for perjury.
Although the fact of a witness' prior indictment or arrest does
have some logical relevancy as to the issue of his credibility,
there is great danger that the trier of fact would ascribe un-
due weight to the accusation of guilt and might too easily jump
to the unwarranted conclusion that the witness was in fact
guilty of the crime for which he was arrested or indicted, and
then conclude that such a person is unworthy of belief. It was
because of this feeling, it would appear, that Article 495 in
1952 was amended in part to provide that "no witness, whether
he be defendant or not, can be asked on cross-examination
whether or not he has ever been indicted or arrested, and can
only be questioned as to conviction, and as provided herein."
31
Does the 1952 amendment prohibit a witness' being ques-
tioned, under all circumstances, concerning his arrests and in-
dictments? State v. Lewis32 makes it clear that the answer to
this question is in the negative. In this case, the fact of the
witness' prior arrest had an independent relevance as tending
to show bias, interest, or corruption. The witness, an alleged
accomplice of defendant, had been called by the state. Defendant
on cross-examination sought to bring out that the witness had
been indicted along with defendant and others for a crime which
was a part of the transaction involved in the instant proceeding,
but "had not been brought to trial for more than a year and
would not be tried, or at least promised leniency, because of his
assistance to the state in testifying at the trials of the others
involved in the crime. ' 33 The court held that reversible error
was committed in refusing to allow the defendant to develop
this line of questioning.
In holding that the 1952 amendment to Article 495 was in-
applicable, the court, in the opinion of this writer, reached what
is clearly the proper conclusion.3 4 Here, the fact of the wit-
ness' arrest was not offered as tending to show that the witness
was a "bad man" and therefore unworthy of belief (which is
prohibited by the 1952 amendment to Article 495), but for a
completely different reason - as tending to show bias, interest,
or corruption. This method of impeachment is clearly recognized
31. LA. R.S. 15:495 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1952, No. 180, § 1.
32. 236 La. 473, 108 So.2d 93 (1959).
33. Id. at 476, 108 So.2d at 95.




by Article 492, and it is submitted that the 1952 amendment to
Article 495 was not intended to limit the scope of Article 492.
The 1952 amendment to Article 495 did not alter the law
with regard to impeachment because of prior convictions. The
fact of a witness' prior conviction may still be brought to the
attention of the jury for the purpose of impeaching the witness'
credibility. Article 495, however, makes it clear that before any
other evidence can be offered to show a prior conviction, the
witness himself must have been cross-examined as to such con-
viction, and that the other evidence of conviction is admissible
only if the witness had himself "failed distinctly to admit the
same." This rule promotes efficiency of trial procedure. If the
witness himself will admit the prior conviction, then the simplest
and least time-consuming way to present this information to
the jury is to develop it from the witness himself. The basis of
the rule, however, probably goes much deeper than mere economy
of time. The damaging effect of a showing of prior conviction
is probably greatly lessened if the witness himself is given the
opportunity to "come clean." Undue prejudice might result
from permitting opposing counsel to use the more dramatic
method of showing the prior conviction by other means. The
latter device may waft an implication to the jury that the wit-
ness was "covering up" his prior record, an implication which
may be unwarranted. In State v. Scott,8 5 the court, following
the clear language of Article 495, affirmed the action of the
trial judge in refusing to permit defense counsel to cross-ex-
amine a state's witness concerning his personal knowledge of
another state's witness' having "served time in the State Peniten-
tiary for cattle theft,"' 6 for the proper foundation had not been
laid. The supposed ex-convict had not been given the opportunity
on cross-examination to affirm or deny the purported fact.
Impeaching of own Witness
Article 487 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that
no one can impeach his own witness unless taken by surprise by
the testimony of the witness, or unless the witness show hostility
toward him, and that even in such cases impeachment myst be
limited to prior contradictory statements. Article 488 then states
that "surprise" as used in the prior article "does not arise out
35. 237 La. 71, 110 So.2d 530 (1959).
36. Id. at 90, 110 So.2d at 537.
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of the mere failure of the witness to testify as expected, but
out of his testifying upon some material matter against the party
introducing him and in favor of the other side." (Emphasis
added.) Article 493 further provides that in order to impeach
a witness on the ground of prior contradictory statements, he
must be first asked whether he made the statement and the
time, place, and circumstances under which it was made. The
reasons for the requirement of this foundation are similar to
those, discussed above, which require the laying of a foundation
before impeachment of a witness by introducing evidence of prior
conviction.
The application of these rules in State v. Knox37 is somewhat
questionable. Previous to the trial in the lower court, a state's
witness (an inmate in the state penitentiary) had apparently
informed the district attorney in the presence of five witnesses
"that the defendant was in effect the prime mover in the rob-
bery." 38 At the trial, when questioned by the district attorney,
the witness "changed his testimony and stated that he was not
sure that he knew the defendant." 39 The district attorney then
placed him on guard and asked whether he had not made certain
contrary statements, pointing out the time, place, and names of
persons present. Defense counsel took exception to the trial
judge's permitting the district attorney to plead surprise and
objected "that the district attorney had not laid the proper
foundation for the impeachment of the witness." 40 The Supreme
Court, citing Articles 487, 488, and 493 without discussion, af-
firmed the action of the trial judge rejecting the contentions of
defendant.
It does not appear from the reported opinion that the state's
witness was "hostile" or that he did any more than state that
"he was not sure that he knew the defendant." It would seem
that the state was not "surprised" within the meaning of Ar-
ticles 487 and 488, for apparently the witness did not testify
''upon some material matter against the party introducing him
and in favor of the other side." Therefore, it would appear that
the district attorney was without authority to impeach his own
witness. The reason for the narrow definition of "surprise"
given in Article 488, which causes considerable stricture upon
37. 236 La. 461, 107 So.2d 719 (1959).





the possibility of impeaching one's own witness by the showing
of prior contradictory statements, is clear. The prior contradic-
tory statement of a witness offered for the purpose of impeach-
ment may not be used as substantive evidence and may be used
solely for the purpose of neutralizing the testimony given by
the witness on the stand. If one's own witness has testified to
no material matter against the party calling him and in favor
of his opponent, then it would appear that the showing of a
prior inconsistent statement is being made only for its substan-
tive effect. For the trier of fact to give such a statement sub-
stantive effect is forbidden. The prior statement was made out-
side of court, was not made under oath, and was not subject to
cross-examination. To admit it for substantive weight would,
in the opinion of this writer, contravene the hearsay rule.
Since it would appear that the district attorney was without
authority to impeach his own witness under the circumstances
of this case, it would likewise appear that he was without au-
thority to lay a foundation for such impeachment.
Comment on Defendant's Failure To Take the Stand
In State v. Stahl,41 defendant contended on appeal that when
the district attorney had asked the sheriff whether the defend-
ant had been given a lie detector test, the remark constituted a
comment on the failure of the defendant to take the stand, and
that his motion for a mistrial should have been granted. When
the question was asked and an objection made, the district at-
torney had stated that "he would withdraw the question if any
objection was made. ' '4 2 The Supreme Court stated that the ob-
jection was sustained by the trial court and that so far as the
record shows, the question was never answered. In the opinion
of the writer, the Supreme Court was correct in rejecting the
contention of defense counsel that the remark by the district
attorney was a comment on defendant's failure to take the stand.
Problems with respect to the harmful effects that may result
from merely asking a question, even though it is never answered,
are discussed in a casenote on the Stahl case appearing elsewhere
in this Review. 48
41. 236 La. 362, 107 So.2d 670 (1959).
42. Id. at 369, 107 So.2d at 672.




Article 485 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides in
part that "Whenever a witness has been impeached or contra-
dicted, or his character or credibility been assailed, corroborative
testimony is admissible." In State v. Stahl,44 defendant, an
inmate at the state penitentiary, had been tried and convicted
of the murder of a fellow inmate. On appeal, he contended that
the trial judge had erred in (1) permitting the state to bring
out on redirect examination of the main state's witness, who
was also a convict, that after the trial, the witness would have
to be "locked apart from the other prisoners as his life would
be in danger" ;45 and (2) permitting similar information to be
elicited from the penitentiary warden. The action of the trial
judge was affirmed by the Supreme Court, which quoted Article
485 and the per curiam of the trial judge, which had stated
that the witness had been assailed on cross-examination, that it
had been brought out that the witness had been convicted five
times, that it was suggested in very possible manner that the
witness had been promised something to testify, and that every
possible insinuation relative to the witness' character and
credibility had been made.
HEARSAY
In Sallier v. Boudreaux,4 an issue in the case concerned
whether certain property had been acquired by defendant's an-
cestor in title Nathaniel Vincent at the succession sale of prop-
erty belonging to Nathaniel's father, Simeon Vincent. The orig-
inal succession proceedings had been burned in 1910 by the fire
which destroyed the Calcasieu Parish courthouse. In support of
defendant's contention that Nathaniel Vincent had purchased
the property at the succession sale of his father, a witness was
called who testified that when he was about twenty years old,
he had attended the public sale of property belonging to the
estate of Simeon Vincent, that the witness' father "also was
present and assisted Nathaniel Vincent in conducting the sale,
and that his father told him on that day that Nathaniel Vincent
'got' the property here at issue in that sale. 47 Plaintiffs objected
to the witness' stating what his father had told him, but the trial
44. 236 La. 362, 107 So.2d 670 (1959).
45. Id. at 379, 107 So.2d at 676.
46. 237 La. 909, 112 So.2d 657 (1959).
47. Id. at 919, 112 So.2d at 660.
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judge, citing the case of Vidrine v. Deshotels,48 held that the
testimony was admissible. Adopting the written opinion of the
trial judge, the decision of the lower court was affirmed. With
deference, it is submitted that the trial judge erred in holding
that the evidence was proper and admissible. Citing with ap-
proval the case of Landry v. Laplos,49 the court in the Vidrine
case stated that under certain circumstances the adjudication of
succession property could be proved by parol evidence, but this
is quite different from holding that it may be proved by hearsay.
In the Vidrine case there were three eye witnesses who testified
at the trial that the property had been purchased at the public
sale by the party in question, and in addition there was testi-
mony by a fourth witness that although he was not at the sale,
"he met several persons coming from the house after the sale
and that he knew there was a sale."50 The Vidrine and Sallier
cases, therefore, are quite different. None of the witnesses in the
Vidrine case were testifying as to what someone else said as to
who had purchased property at a succession sale. There may be
some question as to the testimony of the fourth witness in the
Vidrine case that there had been a sale, for there is no showing
that he knew of his own knowledge that a sale had taken place,
but it should be noted that there is no indication in the Vidrine
decision that his testimony was objected to as hearsay. Apparent-
ly in the Sallier case, the witness did not know of his own knowl-
edge that Nathaniel Vincent had been the adjudicatee at the
succession sale, although he did have first hand knowledge that
a sale had taken place. To permit him to testify to what his
father told him as to who "got" the property is to go much fur-
ther than simply holding that under certain circumstances an
adjudication at a succession sale can be shown by parol evidence;
it is admitting hearsay evidence to show an adjudication to a
particular person. The father of the witness was not under oath
or subject to cross-examination at the time he made the state-
ment, and it is suggested that his out-of-court statement to his
son should not have been admitted in evidence.
Hospital Records
Louisiana R.S. 13:3714 ' provides that a certified copy of a
chart or record of a Louisiana charity hospital or a veterans
48. 181 La. 50, 158 So. 618 (1935).
49. 113 La. 697, 37 So. 606 (1904).
50. 181 La. 50, 54-55, 158 So. 618, 619 (1935).
51. LA. R.S. .13:3714 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1952, No. 519, § 1.
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hospital located in this state is admissible in evidence as prima
facie proof of its contents, "provided that the party against
whom the said record is sought to be used shall have the right
to summon and examine those making the original of said record
as witnesses under cross-examination." Citing this provision,
the Supreme Court in State v. Kelly52 affirmed the action of the
trial court in admitting a record of the Charity Hospital of New
Orleans which stated that the defendant had been treated for a
bullet wound.
Declarations by Co-Conspirators
Under the provisions of Article 455 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, a co-conspirator is deemed to assent to statements
made or actions done in furtherance of the common enterprise,
provided a prima facie case of conspiracy has been established.
In State v. Melerine,8 the Supreme Court, citing this article and
prior jurisprudence, affirmed the action of the trial court in
permitting a playing of tape recordings of declarations made by
one who had been charged with malfeasance in office along with
defendants, but as to whom a severance had been granted.
Police Report
In State v. Kelly54 the Supreme Court affirmed the action of
the trial court in overruling defendant's objection to the intro-
duction of the original vehicle theft report of the New Orleans
Police Department offered by the state to corroborate the testi-
mony of its accomplice-witness that the witness had stolen an
automobile on the day of the robbery and shooting. It was urged,
inter alia, on appeal, that the record was hearsay. The trial
court had instructed the jury that the purpose of the evidence
was "'merely and only to prove whether or not the police had
such an entry in their records or not, not to prove the theft of
the automobile.' 55 The Supreme Court stated that "the objec-
tion was to the weight and sufficiency of the evidence, rather
than to its admissibility,"5 6 and that "under such conditions, it
was properly admitted in evidence."5 7 It does not appear al-
together clear to the writer whether the Supreme Court treated
52. 237 La. 956, 112 So.2d 674 (1959).
53. 236 La. 930, 109 So.2d 471 (1959).
54. ,237 La. 956, 112 So.2d 674 (1959).





the report as coming in under an exception (public document)
to the hearsay rule, or as non-hearsay - fact of utterance rather
than utterance of fact. It would appear, however, that what the
state was really interested in was establishing the truth of the
report, that the vehicle had in fact been stolen, and that the
trier of fact would accept the evidence as such, ascribing to it
testimonial value. It is submitted that the evidence was hear-
say,58 that the police report did not fall properly within any
exception to the hearsay rule, and that it should have been ex-
cluded.5 9
BEST EVIDENCE
In State v. McCrory"° the court held that a failure to comply
with the provisions of Article 436 of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure relative to the production of the best evidence (here a
case of whiskey which was the object of the alleged burglary),
where the same was concededly in the possession of the district
attorney, was prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused.
The Supreme Court also made it clear during the last term"'
that where it is permissible to show the contents of an out-of-
court conversation, it may be shown either by a tape recording
thereof, or by a witness who was present, and that there is no
violation of the best evidence rule, regardless which of these
methods is used.
Proof of Lost Document
In Sallier v. Boudreaux,62 The Supreme Court adopted with
approval the opinion of the trial judge which had cited the pro-
visions of R.S. 44:32563 and prior jurisprudence,6 4 and held that
58. Comment, Hearsay and Non-Hearsay as Reflected in Louisiana Criminal
Cases, 14 LOUISIANA LAW RuviEw 611 (1954).
59. See LA. R.S. 15:485 (1950) (admissibility of corroborative testimony;
testimony of accomplice) ; State v. Hataway, 144 La. 138, 80 So. 227 (1918);
State v. Callahan, 47 La. Ann. 444, 17 So. 50 (1895) ; 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL
EVrDENCE § 431 (11th ed. 1935) ; Comment, Rehabilitation of WVitnesses in Lou-
isiana, 12 TUL. L. REV. 286, 295 (1938).
60. 237 La. 747, 112 So.2d 432 (1959).
61. State v. Melerine, 236 La. 881, 109 So.2d 454 (1959) ; State v. Melerine,
236 La. 930, 109 So.2d 471 (1959).
62. 237 La. 909, 112 So.2d 657 (1959).
63. "The provisions of this Sub-part shall not prevent the establishment of any
judgment or any other instrument of writing, by parol evidence, where the original
record has been destroyed by the burning of the courthouse or any other place of
deposit of public records, or destroyed in any other way in the parish."
64. Childers v. Hudson, 223 La. 181, 65 So.2d 131 (1953) ; Grotevant v. Dor-
restein, 152 La. 734, 94 So. 372 (1922). To these two cases, the Supreme Court
added a third: Lyons v. Goodman, 78 So.2d 424 (La. App. 1955).
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EVIDENCE
parol evidence is admissible to establish the existence and con-
tents of records which have been destroyed by the burning of a




Article 422 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides in
part that "judicial cognizance is taken of... the political, social
and racial conditions prevailing in this state." In the two
Melerine cases,6 on a motion to recuse the district attorney, it
was urged by the defendant that the Supreme Court should take
judicial notice of the political conditions existing in the parish
in question, that the parish was "a political hot-bed,"' 7 and
"that the district attorney herein had lost control of the Police
Jury"6 from which it was argued that the district attorney had
a political advantage in connection with the trial of the president
and vice-president of the police jury for malfeasance in office.
The request was properly denied, for the provisions of Article
422 should not be construed as authorizing judicial cognizance
of such alleged specific conditions.
65. See LA. CIVnL CODE art. 2280 (1870); LA. R.S. 44:321 (1950).
66. 236 La. 881, 109 So.2d 454 (1959) and 236 La. 930, 109 So.2d 471
(1959).
67. 236 La. 881, 898, 109 So.2d 454, 460 (1959) ; 236 La. 930, 946, 109 So.2d
471, 477 (1959).
68. See note 67 aupra.
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